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Many cosmologists (myself included) have advocated volume weighting for the cosmological mea-
sure problem, weighting spatial hypersurfaces by their volume. However, this often leads to the
Boltzmann brain problem, that almost all observations would be by momentary Boltzmann brains
that arise very briefly as quantum fluctuations in the late universe when it has expanded to a huge
size, so that our observations (too ordered for Boltzmann brains) would be highly atypical and un-
likely. Here it is suggested that volume weighting may be a mistake. Volume averaging is advocated
as an alternative. One consequence may be a loss of the argument that eternal inflation gives a
nonzero probability that our universe now has infinite volume.
PACS numbers: PACS 98.80.Qc, 03.65.Ta, 02.50.Cw, 03.65.Ca
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most serious problems of theoretical cosmol-
ogy today is the measure problem, the problem of how to
make statistical predictions for observations in a universe
that may be so large that almost all theoretically possible
observations actually occur somewhere. One would like
to be able to calculate what fraction each possible class
of observations makes out of all possible observations.
However, this is problematic if the universe is infinitely
large and if there are infinitely many observations of each
class. Then one has the ambiguities of taking the ratios
of infinite quantities.
This ambiguity of dividing infinity by infinity occurs
not only for open universes that automatically have infi-
nite volume (and hence presumably infinitely many ob-
servations, assuming a nonzero average density of ob-
servers), but also for closed universes that have eternal
inflation to make them arbitrarily large. A huge effort [1-
47] has gone into proposing procedures for making well-
defined ratios of the resulting infinities of different classes
of observations.
One particular challenge has come from a consideration
of Boltzmann brains [48-74], which are putative observers
that can apparently form from thermal and/or vacuum
fluctuations arbitrarily late in a universe that lasts for-
ever. If the spacetime (perhaps after being regularized to
just a finite comoving volume if the actual total spatial
volume is infinite) has only a finite four-volume where
ordinary observers like us can live (e.g., during the fi-
nite lifetime of stars), but if it lasts infinitely long and
if Boltzmann brains can form at a nonzero (even if ex-
tremely small) rate per four-volume, then it seems there
will be an infinite number of Boltzmann brains in com-
parison with us ordinary observers. Making the plausible
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assumption that only a very tiny fraction of Boltzmann
brain observations are similar to our ordered observations
(so that we can statistically exclude the hypothesis that
we are Boltzmann brains), then since Boltzmann brains
would infinitely dominate over ordinary observers, obser-
vations like ours would form only a very tiny fraction of
the whole and so would be extremely unlikely.
Thus Boltzmann brains appear to be a reductio ad ab-
surdum for present cosmological theories that allow or-
dinary observers in only an infinitesimally tiny fraction
of spacetime and that allow infinitely more Boltzmann
brains to form from fluctuations throughout a spacetime
that lasts forever. It is not that cosmologists have lost
their brains in considering Boltzmann brains [75], since
few of us believe that Boltzmann brains really infinitely
dominate over ordinary observers. Instead, we realize
that Boltzmann brains form a paradox rather analogous
to the ultraviolet catastrophe that plagued the classical
thermodynamics of radiation before Planck’s introduc-
tion of the quantum that cured that problem. Now we
need a suitable solution to the measure problem to cure
the putative catastrophe of Boltzmann brains.
Since Boltzmann brains are expected to form at only
extremely tiny rates, such as perhaps ∼ e−10
42
from vac-
uum fluctuations of a 1 kg brain for a time equal to
the light travel time across it [55], one way to avoid
the problem is for the universe to have a finite lifetime
[53, 54, 57, 59, 71]. With a putative decaying universe,
the problem might be solved (so long as what the uni-
verse decays into does not itself have too many Boltz-
mann brains). However, this puts severe restrictions on
the decay rate.
The tightest restriction would come if the universe
asymptotically expands exponentially, as would be the
prediction from the currently observed cosmic accelera-
tion if the dark energy driving the expansion has con-
stant energy density (e.g., a cosmological constant, or
the bottom of a potential well for a scalar field). If one
imagined that such an asymptotically de Sitter universe
2decays deterministically at a fixed time, it would need to
decay within about 1052 years, before the total number
of Boltzmann brains per comoving volume would dom-
inate over ordinary observers. However, if the universe
decayed quantum mechanically with an uncertain time
of the actual decay, one would need the expected decay
time to be less than about 20 billion years [53, 59, 71]
in order that the expectation value of the four-volume
per comoving volume not be infinite and lead to an in-
finite domination by Boltzmann brains. Although such
an astronomically rapid decay is not directly ruled out
observationally, it would apparently require unnaturally
fine tuning [53, 59, 71].
There are by now quite a number of other proposed
solutions to the Boltzmann brain paradox [48-74], but
all of them, including my own suggestions, seem to me
rather unnatural. The main problem seems to arise from
the rather plausible deduction that there should be an
infinite number of Boltzmann brains that arise in any
spacetime that lasts forever, especially if it also expands
by an unbounded amount.
Here I propose that at least a major part of the Boltz-
mann brain problem could be averted if one abandoned
the volume weighting that seems to imply that there is
more weight for Boltzmann brain observations for spaces
of larger volume. I suggest replacing volume weighting by
the assumption that one should average over the volume
of space, so that two spatial hypersurfaces with the same
density of each class of observations, but with different
spatial volumes, would give the same weights for these
classes of observations (if the two hypersurfaces have the
same quantum amplitudes).
One would still need to sum or average over all spatial
hypersurfaces in the quantum state the result that one
gets for the volume-averaged weights for each class of ob-
servation on each spatial hypersurface. It is less clear to
me what is the most natural way to do this sum or av-
erage over different hypersurfaces, so that there is still
a potential Boltzmann brain problem from a sum or in-
tegral over an infinite number of different hypersurfaces,
such as in a universe that lasts forever. This problem
might be averted if the universe does have a finite life-
time [24, 74], which with volume averaging rather than
volume weighting might be very long and not requiring
fine tuning, though there do remain potential problems
with this that I shall discuss below. Another idea that
I shall pursue below is in a classical approximation to
restrict to closed spatial hypersurfaces of constant trace
of the extrinsic curvature (i.e., three times the direction-
averaged Hubble ‘constant’ H), and then to do the inte-
gral over dH .
Volume weighting has been the basis for the hypothe-
sis that slow-roll eternal inflation [11, 76, 77, 78] makes
the universe infinitely large (at least with some nonzero
probability [79]), that not only did the universe undergo
an early period of rapid quasi-exponential expansion, but
also that quantum fluctuations produce an unboundedly
large amount of inflation by today. Therefore, abandon-
ing volume weighting in favor of volume averaging would
apparently remove the argument for a nonzero probabil-
ity for eternal inflation to give infinite volume at the time
of observers. It would suggest that although the universe
may have inflated by a very large amount, it would not
have inflated by an infinite amount. As a result, if space
is compact, it may well have a bounded volume with unit
probability. Such a finite universe can more easily avoid
the measure problem ambiguities of taking the ratio of
infinite quantities that occur in infinite universes arising
from eternal inflation.
II. THE MEASURE PROBLEM IN QUANTUM
COSMOLOGY
A goal of quantum cosmology is to come up with one
or more theories Ti that predict the probabilities of ob-
servations, by which I mean probabilities for the results
of observations. Here for simplicity I shall assume that
there is a countable set of possible distinct observations
Oj out of some exhaustive set of all such observations.
This set of possible observations might be all possible
conscious perceptions [19, 80], all possible data sets for
one observer, or all possible data sets for a human sci-
entific information gathering and utilizing system [63].
(However, one should not mix different types of observa-
tions that are not distinct from each other, such as the
data set for one person and the data set for all persons
in some civilization, since they are not distinct observa-
tions; one can give rise to the other.) If one imagines
a continuum for the set of observations (which seems to
be logically possible, though not required), in that case I
shall assume that they are binned into a countable num-
ber of exclusive and exhaustive subsets that each may
be considered to form one distinct observation Oj . Then
the goal is to calculate the probability P (Oj |Ti) for the
observation Oj , given the theory Ti.
As noted in [73], the mutually exclusive and exhaustive
(complete) set of possible observations and the probabil-
ities assigned to them by the theories should obey the
following principles:
(1) Prior Alternatives Principle (PAP):
The set of alternatives to be assigned likelihoods by
theories Ti should be chosen prior to (or independent of)
the observation Oj to be used to test the theories.
(2) Principle of Observational Discrimination (POD):
Each possible complete observation should uniquely
distinguish one element from the set of alternatives.
(3) Normalization Principle (NP):
The sum of the likelihoods each theory assigns to all
of the alternatives in the chosen set should be unity,
∑
j
P (Oj |Ti) = 1. (2.1)
One common strategy in cosmology is to calculate an
unnormalized probability for each possible observation
3within a fixed finite region and then try to form a nor-
malized sum of these over all regions of spacetime. The
problem arises when there are an infinite number of re-
gions and the sum of the unnormalized probabilities for
each region diverges when being added over all regions.
Then it is not clear how to normalize the divergent sum
to get unambiguous finite ratios of the total probabilities
for different possible observations. A lot of clever effort
has gone into schemes for regularizing the total proba-
bilities [1-47] but is seems fair to say that most of these
schemes look rather ad hoc and unnatural, at least to me.
One might think that once one has a quantum state for
the universe, there would be a standard quantum answer
to the question of the probabilities for the various possi-
ble observations. For example [73], one might take stan-
dard quantum theory to give the probability P (Oj |Ti) of
the observation as the expectation value, in the quantum
state given by the theory Ti, of a projection operator Pj
onto the observational result Oj . That is, one might take
P (Oj |Ti) = 〈Pj〉i, (2.2)
where 〈〉i denotes the quantum expectation value of
whatever operator is inside the angular brackets in the
quantum state i given by the theory Ti (which I am tak-
ing not only to give the dynamics, e.g. the Hamilto-
nian, or more generally the constraint equations of quan-
tum gravity, but also to give the boundary conditions,
e.g., the quantum state itself in the Heisenberg repre-
sentation). This standard approach works in the case of
a single laboratory setting where the projection opera-
tors onto different observational results are orthogonal,
PjPk = δjkPj (no sum over repeated indices).
However [73, 81], in the case of a sufficiently large uni-
verse, one may have observation Oj occurring ‘here’ and
observation Ok occurring ‘there’ in a compatible way, so
that Pj and Pk are not orthogonal. Then the standard
quantum probabilities given by Eq. (2.2) will generically
not obey the Normalization Principle Eq. (2.1). Thus
one needs a different formula for normalizable probabili-
ties of a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of possible
observations, when distinct observations within the com-
plete set cannot be described by orthogonal projection
operators.
The simplest class of modifications of Eq. (2.2) would
seem to be to replace the projection operators Pj with
some other ‘observation operators’Qj normalized so that∑
j〈Qj〉i = 1, giving
P (Oj |Ti) = 〈Qj〉i. (2.3)
Of course, one also wants P (Oj |Ti) ≥ 0 for each i and j,
so one needs to impose the requirement that the expecta-
tion value of each observation operatorQj in each theory
Ti is nonnegative. If one wanted the Qj ’s to be indepen-
dent of the theory Ti and wished to allow different Ti’s to
give all possible quantum states, then it would be natural
to restrict the Qj’s to positive operators. This is what
I have usually assumed, but it would be well to remem-
ber that it is just 〈Qj〉i that needs to be nonnegative for
each i and j, and that in principle the Qj ’s themselves
can depend on the theory Ti.
The main point [73, 81] is that in cosmology one can-
not simply use the expectation values of projection op-
erators as the probabilities of observations, so that each
theory must assign a set of observation operatorsQj , cor-
responding to the set of possible observations Oj , whose
expectation values are used instead as the probabilities
of the observations. Since these operators are not given
directly by the formalism of standard quantum theory,
they must be added to that formalism by each particu-
lar complete theory. In other words, a complete theory
Ti cannot be given merely by the dynamical equations
and initial conditions (the quantum state), but it also
requires the set of observation operators Qj whose ex-
pectation values are the probabilities of the observations
Oj in the complete set of possible observations. The mea-
sure is not given purely by the quantum state but has its
own logical independence in a complete theory.
In quantum terms, the measure problem is the prob-
lem (say for giving a complete formulation of a theory Ti)
of choosing the observation operatorsQj whose quantum
expectation values are nonnegative and normalized in the
quantum state that is also to be given by the theory Ti.
The greatest challenge in a theory giving an infinite uni-
verse (or a superposition of finite universes for which the
expectation value of the size is infinite) is the normaliza-
tion.
For example, assuming a classical spacetime as a suit-
able approximation, one might hypothetically partition
the spacetime into a countable set of disjoint regions la-
beled by the index K, with each region sufficiently small
that for each K separately there is a set of orthogonal
projection operators PKj whose expectation values give
good approximations to the probabilities that the obser-
vations Oj occur within the region K. (However, I am
assuming that each observation Oj can in principle oc-
cur within any of the regions, so that the content of the
observation is not sufficient to distinguish what K is; the
observation does not determine where one is in the space-
time. One might imagine that an observation determines
as much as it is possible to know about some local region
of spacetime, or even about the entire causal past of a lo-
cal region, but it does not determine the properties of the
spacelike separated region outside, which might go into
the specification of the index K that is only known to a
hypothetical superobserver that makes the partition.)
Now one might propose that one construct the projec-
tion operator
Pj = I−
∏
K
(I−PKj ) (2.4)
and use it in Eq. (2.2) to get a putative probability of the
observation Oj in the quantum state given by the theory
Ti. (For simplicity I assume that the P
K
j ’s for different
values of K all commute, so that Pj is indeed a projec-
tion operator.) Indeed, this is essentially in quantum lan-
guage [73] what Hartle and Srednicki [63] propose, that
4the probability of an observation is the probability that
it occur at least somewhere. However, because the differ-
entPj ’s defined this way are not orthogonal, the resulting
standard quantum probabilities given by Eq. (2.2) will
not be normalized to obey Eq. (2.1). This lack of nor-
malization is a consequence of the fact that even though
it is assumed that two different observations Oj and Ok
(with j 6= k) cannot both occur within the same region
K, one can have Oj occurring within one region and Ok
occurring within another region. Therefore, the existence
of the observation Oj at least somewhere is not incom-
patible with the existence of the distinct observation Ok
somewhere else, so the sum of the existence probabilities
is not constrained to be unity.
If one were the hypothetical superobserver who has ac-
cess to what is going on in all the regions, one could make
up a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of joint ob-
servations occurring within all of the regions. However,
for us observers who are confined to just part of the uni-
verse, the probabilities that such a superobserver might
deduce for the various combinations of joint observations
are inaccessible for us to test or to use to predict what
we might be expected to see in the future. Instead, we
would like probabilities for the observations we ourselves
can make. I am assuming that each Oj is an observa-
tional result that in principle we could have, but that we
do not have access to knowing which region K we are in.
(The only properties of K that we can know are its local
properties that are known in the observation Oj itself,
but that is not sufficient to determine K, which might
be determined by properties of the spacetime beyond our
local knowledge.)
A better proposal [73], though only one out of a large
number of logically possible alternatives [81], would be
to form the sum
Rj =
∑
K
PKj (2.5)
of the projection operators PKj over all regions K but for
the same observation j, and then to normalize this in the
theory Ti to construct the positive observation operator
Qj =
Rj∑
k〈Rk〉i
(2.6)
to be used in Eq. (2.3) to give the normalized probability
of the observation Oj in the theory Ti as
P (Oj |Ti) = 〈Qj〉i =
〈
∑
K P
K
j 〉i∑
k〈
∑
K P
K
k 〉i
. (2.7)
This procedure appears to be the quantum language
for what is usually done more informally by adding
up, over all regions, the unnormalized probabilities for
each region and then normalizing the result. If one
makes the approximation of a uniform density of observa-
tions per volume, this procedure gives volume weighting.
Then if one has a quantum state with different ampli-
tudes for different volumes (e.g., from stochastic infla-
tion [11, 76, 77, 78]), the amplitudes for greater volumes
(and hence a greater number of observers) would be more
greatly weighted. Taking this to its logical conclusion
[11, 76, 77, 78], this leads to infinite volume in eternal
inflation, in which the probabilities for observations are
dominated by the components of the quantum state in
which the universe has undergone an unbounded amount
of inflation.
Once one has a nonzero probability for the volume to
diverge at the time of observers or at reheating, as one
does with volume weighting in eternal inflation even for
closed universes [79], one has the problem of how to pro-
duce well-defined normalized probabilities, say by find-
ing well-defined normalized observation operators Qj if
one uses quantum language. This is a manifestation of
the measure problem. Furthermore, there is the danger
that the result might be dominated by Boltzmann brains,
making our actual observations extremely unlikely in the-
ories predicting such domination. Therefore, one is led
to question the procedure of forming the observation op-
erators Qj by summing over spacetime regions and then
attempting to normalize the result.
III. REPLACING VOLUME WEIGHTING
WITH VOLUME AVERAGING
Volume weighting has been advocated by proponents of
eternal inflation [11, 76, 77, 78]. I have advocated it my-
self [82] to try to save the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary
proposal from the fact that it gives the highest bare am-
plitudes for universes with a small amount of inflation.
It has been invoked in a similar way more recently by
Hawking [40] and by Hartle, Hawking, and Hertog [42].
However, as we have seen, it gives the problem of infinite
total unnormalized probabilities and the ambiguities of
how to normalize the probabilities, as well as the danger
of domination by Boltzmann brains.
To help avoid these problems from domination by arbi-
trarily large volumes, I propose replacing volume weight-
ing by volume averaging. That is, when calculating the
expectation value of Qj over the entire quantum state
that is a superposition of different spatial geometries and
matter fields, weight the absolute square of the ampli-
tude for that space and matter configuration, not by the
volume integral of the density of the occurrence of the
observation Oj , but rather by the volume-averaged value
of the density. Then, for spatial geometries and matter
field configurations that have the same average density of
the observation Oj , the weights contributing to P (Oj |Ti)
are just the squared amplitudes in the quantum state for
the different spatial configurations, without any volume
weighting.
This is the main new idea I would like to propose at
present. It is somewhat ad hoc in that it cannot be de-
rived from any basic underlying quantum theory [81].
However, at the level of what measure to place on obser-
vations occurring on a single hypersurface, volume av-
eraging seems to be the simplest alternative to volume
5weighting. Therefore, if volume weighting leads to trou-
ble, volume averaging might appear to be an attractive
alternative.
Unfortunately, we are not done yet with the problem.
To investigate the consequences of volume averaging, one
needs to say how one will add up the measures from the
various possible hypersurfaces. For this part of the prob-
lem, all the ideas I have come up with so far seem quite ad
hoc, with many conceivable alternatives and with many
problems for each idea. Therefore, I certainly cannot
claim to have a complete natural solution to the measure
problem. However, in the hope that volume averaging
might be part of an ultimate solution when the problem
of how to add the measures from different hypersurface
is solved, let me make some initial attempts to say how
one might do that addition.
In canonical quantum gravity, one would ultimately
like to do an average over all diffeomorphisms. However,
since the group of all diffeomorphisms is an enormous
infinite-dimensional set, I shall leave it as a future prob-
lem how to implement this averaging over all diffeomor-
phisms to give the probabilities of observations. Here
I shall merely seek an implementation for the approxi-
mation that applies when the quantum state is consid-
ered to give an ensemble of classical spacetimes with cer-
tain properties. (However, there is no guarantee that the
quantum state will give an ensemble of classical space-
times, just as the quantum state of a hydrogen atom
need not give an ensemble of classical electron orbits, so
ultimately we are likely to need a more quantum imple-
mentation.)
IV. HYPERSURFACES OF CONSTANT MEAN
EXTRINSIC CURVATURE H
For each classical spacetime in an ensemble, rather
than looking at all possible hypersurfaces embedded in
the spacetime, one might restrict attention to a certain
subset of these. For example, one might look at a set
of hypersurfaces that foliate the spacetime, so that each
spacetime event lies on one and only only of these foliat-
ing hypersurfaces.
For globally hyperbolic spacetimes with compact
Cauchy surfaces, York [83, 84] has shown that the equa-
tions of general relativity simplify if one uses a folia-
tion by hypersurfaces of constant mean extrinsic curva-
ture, which one might call the direction-averaged Hubble
‘constant’ H . For three-dimensional spatial hypersur-
faces, this is one-third the trace of the extrinsic curvature,
which itself is the logarithmic expansion rate of the vol-
ume of a comoving region generated by comoving world-
lines orthogonal to the sequence of hypersurfaces. Here I
shall call these hypersurfaces of constant mean extrinsic
curvature ‘constant-H hypersurfaces.’ Each of these hy-
persurfaces has the advantage of being determined just
by the spacetime geometry in the neighborhood of the
hypersurface (unlike, say, hypersurfaces orthogonal to a
congruence of timelike geodesics, which requires that the
congruence be specified throughout the spacetime and
which also leads to problems at caustics of the congru-
ence).
A lot of effort [83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93,
94, 95] has gone into the analysis of the existence and
uniqueness of a foliation by constant-H hypersurfaces,
often under the assumption of the timelike convergence
condition [96] Rabu
aub ≥ 0 for each timelike vector ua
at each point of spacetime. This energy condition, which
is equivalent to the strong energy condition for matter
when the Einstein equations hold with zero cosmological
constant [96], was thought to be “physically reasonable”
[96] in the days before the popularity of inflation and the
observation of cosmic acceleration, both of which violate
the timelike convergence condition.
For example, York [83] notes that in empty closed uni-
verses constant-H hypersurfaces define “a definite slic-
ing of space-time.” Marsden and Tipler [87] prove their
Theorem 3 that a nonflat spacetime having a smooth
spacelike compact Cauchy surface, containing a com-
pact smooth spacelike maximal hypersurface, and sat-
isfying the timelike convergence condition, a hypersur-
face generic condition, and development uniqueness, then
has a unique foliation by compact constant-H hypersur-
faces, with H running from +∞ at the big bang to −∞
at the big crunch, so long as constant-H hypersurfaces
avoid singularities and don’t turn null. Gerhardt [88] and
Bartnik [89] have proved the existence of such a foliation
under less stringent conditions (though still assuming the
timelike convergence condition), though Bartnik [89] also
gives an example of a cosmological spacetime with com-
pact Cauchy hypersurfaces that obeys the timelike con-
vergence condition and yet does not have any constant-H
Cauchy hypersurfaces. Later Isenberg and Rendall [90]
give an example that has a constant-H Cauchy hypersur-
face but is not covered by a foliation of such constant-H
hypersurfaces.
Less seems to be known about constant-H hypersur-
faces in spacetimes not obeying the timelike convergence
condition, such as inflationary spacetimes, though the
second paper cited by Brill and Flaherty [86] consid-
ers a cosmological constant and discusses in detail the
case of a Taub-type universe that is homogeneous but
anisotropic. For de Sitter spacetime, Akutagawa [91] in
three dimensions and Montiel [92] in higher dimensions
showed that compact constant-H hypersurfaces are all
umbilical, meaning that all of the eigenvalues of the ex-
trinsic curvature are equal. These hypersurfaces are all
obtained by taking constant-time hypersurfaces in the
k = +1 FRW representation of de Sitter and performing
de Sitter symmetry transformations. (On the other hand
[91, 92, 94], there are complete noncompact constant-
H hypersurfaces in de Sitter that are not umbilical and
hence not isometric to the umbilical noncompact hyper-
surfaces of constant time in the k = 0 and k = −1 FRW
representations of de Sitter.)
The sequence of constant-time k = +1 hypersurfaces
6of de Sitter gives a foliation of the entirety of de Sitter
by compact constant-H hypersurfaces, but since one can
perform de Sitter symmetry transformations of each of
these hypersurfaces, this foliation is not unique. I might
guess that a generic small smooth perturbation of de Sit-
ter would remove this ambiguity and lead to a unique
foliation by compact constant-H hypersurfaces, but I am
not aware of any good evidence either for or against this
guess.
For simplicity, here I shall initially assume that one re-
stricts to ensembles such that each spacetime within the
ensemble may be foliated by complete compact constant-
H Cauchy hypersurfaces. Let t be a time parameter that
is constant over each of these hypersurfaces and which
increases monotonically as one goes to the future along a
sequence of these hypersurfaces. Then one hasH = H(t),
a unique value of H for each t, though if H does not
change monotonically with t, one need not have a unique
t for each H that occurs; there can be more than one
hypersurface with the same H .
Now to avoid dealing with the entire infinite-
dimensional diffeomorphism group, I would propose
gauge fixing to this foliation. One could also fix the time
coordinate t (up to an overall shift by a constant) to
be volume-averaged proper time by letting dt = dV4/V3,
where V3 is the three-volume of the constant-H hypersur-
face at t and dV4 is the four-volume between that hyper-
surface and the one at t+dt. If there is a earliest infimum
for V3 (e.g., zero volume at a big bang, or a minimum vol-
ume at some smallest bounce geometry), one could set
t = 0 there to eliminate the shift ambiguity in t.
Once one has fixed the foliation and the time
parametrization, the remaining diffeomorphism freedom
is the coordinate freedom on the spatial hypersurfaces.
In a neighborhood of any point on one of the hypersur-
faces, one could always gauge fix to Riemann normal
coordinates, thereby reducing the infinite-dimensional
diffeomorphism group on that hypersurface to the six-
dimensional group generated by translations of the point
and rotations of the Riemann normal coordinates about
that point.
Now suppose that instead of being a discrete index
representing which region of spacetime, K is now taken
to be an element of the six-dimensional group of rota-
tions and translations of the Riemann normal coordi-
nates. Then we might imagine that PKj corresponds
to a projection operator onto some field configurations
in the corresponding Riemann normal coordinate system
that would be or give rise to the observation Oj . (For
simplicity, I shall assume that the region needed for the
field configurations does not exceed the applicability of
the Riemann normal coordinates.) Since the observation
should not depend on the orientation or location where
it can occur (assuming that the fields are located and
oriented appropriately there), one might expect that the
contribution to Rj from one hypersurface (say Rj(t))
would be an average over the six-dimensional group of
elements K of the PKj on the hypersurface at that value
of t. (The volume element of the group can be taken to
be the volume element of the three-dimensional rotation
group multiplied by the volume element of hypersurface
for the translations. Since each hypersurface of the foli-
ation is assumed to be compact, the total volume of the
group will also be compact, so the average over the group
should be well defined.)
In this way with gauge fixing to compact Cauchy hy-
persurfaces of constant direction-averaged Hubble rate
H , we can implement volume averaging over each such
hypersurface. We still have to deal with the integral over
different spatial hypersurfaces. It might be noted that by
the preferred foliation of the spacetime, we have avoided
the noncompact integration over boosts in the Lorentz
group. It might seem somewhat artificial to have avoided
this, since one might expect that in principle observations
could be generated by configurations of fields (includ-
ing the fields of the observer) at any velocity relative to
that of the worldlines orthogonal to the preferred folia-
tion by the constant-H hypersurfaces. However, I shall
leave aside that issue for future analysis.
V. INTEGRATING OVER HYPERSURFACES
In the approximation of regarding a quantum space-
time as an ensemble of classical spacetimes, I have pro-
posed gauge fixing to a particular foliation (e.g., by hy-
persurfaces of constant trace of the extrinsic curvature,
constant logarithmic rate of the growth of three-volume)
and then volume averaging on those hypersurfaces. It
remains to say how to combine the effects of different
hypersurfaces in the foliation of each classical spacetime
in the ensemble, that is, how to integrate over the time
parameter t labeling the hypersurfaces in the foliation.
The simplest proposal seems to be
Rj =
∫
Rj(t)dt, (5.1)
where, as given above, Rj(t) is the group average of
PKj over the rotation group and volume of the hyper-
surface of fixed t and constant H(t), and where dt is the
volume-averaged proper time between nearby hypersur-
faces. This proposal might be called proper-time weight-
ing of the hypersurfaces (in distinction to the volume
averaging of observations made within each hypersurface
that is my main proposal, though both parts are needed
for a complete specification of the measure).
Another proposal would be
Rj =
∫
Rj(t)|dH/dt|dt, (5.2)
the sum of
∫
Rj(t)|dH | over all segments of the his-
tory where H changes monotonically with the volume-
averaged proper time t. This proposal might be called
Hubble-constant-time weighting of the hypersurfaces.
7A third proposal is
Rj =
∫
Rj(t)dV4 =
∫
Rj(t)V3(t)dt, (5.3)
where dV4 is the four-volume element between infinitesi-
mally nearby hypersurfaces in the foliation, and V3(t) is
the three-volume of the hypersurface in the foliation at
t. This proposal might be called four-volume weighting
of the hypersurfaces. It essentially restores the three-
volume weighting. Because of the problems I have noted
with volume weighting, here I shall not advocate this
four-volume weighting procedure of the hypersurfaces,
but I am pointing it out to show that it is not a priori
obvious to me that one weighting is intrinsically far su-
perior to another. This fact may just be a manifestation
of what I have noted above [81], that for predicting prob-
abilities of observations, a theory is not fully specified by
just the dynamical laws and boundary conditions, but
rather one also needs the detailed procedure for calculat-
ing the probabilities of observations. Therefore, it may
be a mistake to expect this procedure to arise intrinsically
from the formalism for the dynamical laws and bound-
ary conditions. One needs more than just the quantum
dynamics and the quantum state.
VI. PROBLEMS WITH CONSTANT-H
HYPERSURFACES
Although compact constant-H hypersurfaces seem to
be the simplest prescription for foliating a spacetime
when they work, there are problems with them. First
of course, they certainly will not work to foliate a space-
time that is not globally hyperbolic or that does not have
compact Cauchy hypersurfaces. However, I have no good
idea how to handle such cases at all, so for now I shall
assume that such spacetimes can be excluded. (Perhaps
they never arise from approximations to the quantum
state of the universe, which conceivably could give only
globally hyperbolic spacetimes with compact Cauchy hy-
persurfaces, if it gives spacetimes at all in some level of
approximation.)
Second, there are known examples [89, 90] mentioned
above in which globally hyperbolic spacetimes with com-
pact Cauchy hypersurfaces cannot be foliated by com-
pact constant-H hypersurfaces. One might regard these
examples as also rather pathological, but there is also
a common example in inflation that apparently cannot
be completely foliated by compact constant-H hyper-
surfaces: de Sitter with the formation of a thin-wall
Coleman-De Luccia [97] bubble of Minkowski spacetime
inside. I-Sheng Yang [98] has shown that a foliation by
compact constant-H hypersurfaces covers only a small
part of the Minkowski spacetime region inside the bub-
ble and also avoids an infinite spacetime volume in the de
Sitter region outside the bubble (though it also covers an
infinite spacetime volume in the de Sitter region, up to in-
finite proper time along a large set of timelike worldlines
that stay outside the bubble). Indications suggest that
the similar behavior may occur if a Coleman-De Luccia
bubble of our value of the cosmological constant formed
out of a parent de Sitter universe of a larger cosmological
constant. Then the compact constant-H hypersurfaces
that cross the parent de Sitter region would not enter
into our part of the spacetime nearly far enough to cover
our existence.
If this behavior is indeed confirmed by a more careful
analysis, and if indeed our part of spacetime formed as
a bubble from some pre-existing spacetime with a much
larger cosmological constant, it would suggest that our
existence would not contribute to the measure defined
in terms of a foliation by compact constant-H hypersur-
faces. However, I am a bit sceptical of the usual picture
in eternal inflation that our part of spacetime most prob-
ably formed from tunneling from some previous part of
spacetime with a larger cosmological constant. I would
prefer to explore the alternative that our part of space-
time formed rather directly, without having had a signif-
icant probability to have had ancestor regions of space-
time with different cosmological constants. (Although I
am a creationist in the sense of believing the universe
was created by God, I am not a recent-creationist in the
traditional sense of believing that the universe was cre-
ated within the past ten thousand years or so. But am I a
recent-creationist in the sense that I suspect that the uni-
verse may most probably have started around 14 billion
years ago instead of far earlier before some long series of
tunnelings from some original ancestor spacetime to our
pocket universe? My main worry with the latter popu-
lar scenario is not theological but whether the arrow of
time would persist through an arbitrarily long sequence
of bubble formations and decays, or whether the entire
multiverse would tend toward some sort of heat death
that would be inconsistent with our observations.)
If the main contribution to the path integral for our
present existence comes from our own spacetime region
or pocket universe, without the need for a sequence of
tunnelings from some ancestor region, then our existence
might indeed be covered by some foliation of our region
by compact constant-H hypersurfaces. If our pocket uni-
verse decays into future bubbles of smaller or negative
cosmological constant (e.g., terminal vacua), then the
constant-H foliation may indeed not penetrate very far
into those regions, and it might not cover all of the future
of our apparently asymptotically de Sitter region, but if
it covers the existence of most observers in our part of
spacetime, that should be sufficient to get at least ap-
proximately the right measure for our observations.
VII. ALTERNATIVES TO CONSTANT-H
HYPERSURFACES
Although constant-H hypersurfaces presently seem to
be the simplest known and most studied proposal for
foliating at least some large class of spacetimes, I would
8certainly not claim that they are definitely the correct
way to do things. If indeed they do not work (which does
now seem rather likely if our pocket universe really did
come from a long sequence of decays of previous vacua),
one should look for alternatives.
A common alternative is to postulate some initial
smooth spacelike Cauchy surface, construct timelike
geodesics orthogonal to it, and then define foliating hy-
persurfaces to be the orthogonal hypersurfaces to this
congruence of geodesics. One disadvantage of this proce-
dure is the requirement of the choice of the initial hyper-
surface (or alternatively simply of the congruence itself),
but this might be regarded as a small price to pay if the
result overcomes any severe difficulties that might arise
from other proposed foliations.
A much more severe problem with this proposed foli-
ation is that generically the timelike geodesics will have
conjugate points where they will begin to cross and form
caustics. This will prevent the orthogonal hypersur-
faces from remaining smooth and from being crossed only
once by each inextendible timelike geodesic. Further-
more, there will be more than one hypersurface at many
points of spacetime, where different timelike geodesics
from the initial hypersurface intersect with different val-
ues of proper time. Within the solar system, timelike
geodesics that remain within the sun or a planet will typ-
ically have conjugate points separated by only an hour or
so, making the hypersurfaces orthogonal to the geodesics
run into difficulty very quickly. Therefore, some modifi-
cation of the procedure will be needed.
One modification that can partially ameliorate the
problem is not to require that the hypersurfaces be or-
thogonal to the entire congruence of crossing geodesics,
but instead to have constant values of a time function
that is defined to be the maximum proper time of any
causal curve back to the original hypersurface. The
curves that maximize the proper time will of course be
timelike geodesics that intersect the original hypersur-
face orthogonally, but for later points intersected by more
than one geodesic orthogonal to the original hypersur-
face, only the longest one will count for defining the time
function. Thus one will get definite spacelike hypersur-
faces of constant proper time from this procedure.
One disadvantage of this procedure for getting
constant-proper-time hypersurfaces is that generically on
the three-dimensional hypersurfaces of constant maxi-
mal proper time after the original hypersurface, there
will be two-dimensional surfaces where two such maxi-
mal geodesics intersect. On one side of the two-surface,
the time function will be given by one local congruence,
but on the other, it will be given by a different local con-
gruence. The two congruences will have different tan-
gent vectors (four-velocities) on the two sides, so at the
two-dimensional surface, the normal vector to the three-
dimensional hypersurface will jump by some boost, mak-
ing the constant-time hypersurface have a kink. There
can also be further defects along one-dimensional lines
within the hypersurface, as well as at isolated points.
But if one can live with a foliation by hypersurfaces with
kinks and other defects, and if one is willing to spec-
ify an original hypersurface, then the ones of constant
proper time from the original hypersurface would seem
to work in any globally hyperbolic spacetime with com-
pact Cauchy hypersurfaces.
Another alternative worth exploring is what might be
called ‘minimal-flux hypersurfaces.’ For a given smooth
compact Cauchy hypersurface with unit future-pointing
timelike normal na, the energy density in the frame of
an observer with 4-velocity na is ρ = Tabn
anb, and
the spatial energy flux in the frame of this observer is
Ja = −T abn
b − ρna [99]. First, consider only hypersur-
faces for which the volume average of the energy density
ρ (using the 3-volume element from the metric induced
on the hypersurface by the spacetime metric) has a fixed
value ρ¯. Next, for such hypersurfaces, choose the one that
minimizes the volume average of the square of the spatial
energy flux, JaJa. Assuming the existence and unique-
ness of such a hypersurface, it can be defined to be the
minimal-flux hypersurface for the given value of the aver-
age energy density ρ¯. Finally, consider the one-parameter
sequence of such compact minimal-flux hypersurfaces as
a function of ρ¯. If this indeed foliates the spacetime, this
will be a ‘minimal-flux foliation.’
In the case that the stress-energy tensor Tab has a unit
timelike eigenvector field ua (obeying uaua = −1 and
Tabu
a = −ρˆub for some eigenvalue ρˆ, which is the energy
density in the frame with 4-velocity given by the eigenvec-
tor ua, a frame in which there is no spatial energy flux),
and in the case that this eigenvector field is hypersurface-
orthogonal, then one may choose the hypersurfaces so
that na = ua, giving ρ = ρˆ and Ja = 0, so such hy-
persurfaces would be minimal-flux hypersurfaces. (For
example, in k = +1 FRW spacetimes, the homogeneous
isotropic hypersurfaces of constant t would be such com-
pact minimal-flux hypersurfaces.) However, generically
the timelike eigenvector field (if it exists, which is also
not guaranteed but seems to be the generic case) would
not be hypersurface orthogonal, so that there would not
be hypersurfaces with zero spatial energy flux Ja every-
where. Minimal-flux hypersurfaces make one particular
minimization of the deviation of their normals na from
the timelike eigenvector field ua.
It would be worth exploring more the properties of
minimal-flux hypersurfaces and the cases in which they
do foliate part or all of a spacetime with compact Cauchy
hypersurfaces. For example, do they foliate generic per-
turbations of FRW spacetimes? If a classical approxi-
mation to our quasiclassical component of the quantum
state of the universe does have a minimal-flux hypersur-
face through our present location in this spacetime, what
is the deviation of na from ua at the surface of the earth?
(I might guess that would be of the order of the magni-
tude of the peculiar velocity of our galaxy from the mean
Hubble flow, but one might ask whether the part of space-
time far beyond what we can see could possibly force the
minimal-flux hypersurface to have a significantly greater
9variation of na from ua at our location.)
Minimal-flux hypersurfaces would seem to have the ad-
vantage that their normals na would presumably be close
to the 4-velocity ua of the local matter frame (say given
by the unit eigenvectors of the stress-energy tensor), at
least for situations in which the peculiar velocities of the
matter are small, as is generally the case in our part
of the universe. A foliation by these hypersurfaces thus
might avoid the objection Vilenkin [100] has raised to the
constant-H hypersurfaces, that inside new bubble uni-
verses their normals would typically be at high velocities
to that of the matter there, even if the bubbles were lo-
cally close to open FRW universes. (As noted above, it
now looks [98] as if the problem is even more severe for
such bubbles, in that apparently the compact constant-
H hypersurfaces do not even go very far into the new
bubble universes.) Although I am not convinced that
the dominant contribution to the measure for observa-
tions will come from baby universes arising from bubble
nucleation out of a parent universe (as opposed to direct
creation of our pocket universe without any ancestors),
if one does want to investigate the measure inside baby
bubble universes, minimal-flux hypersurfaces might be a
better attempt for a foliation. However, this has not yet
been investigated.
One difficulty in analyzing minimal-flux hypersurfaces
is that they rely for their definition on the stress-energy
tensor and so are not defined for vacuum spacetimes, but
that should not be a problem for any spacetime region
rather like our own, which certainly does have matter
and a nonzero stress-energy tensor. There might con-
ceivably be difficulties in an asymptotically de Sitter fu-
ture part of spacetime with a cosmological constant as
the non-vacuum part of the stress-energy tensor tends
toward zero. (A purely vacuum part proportional to the
metric, such as the cosmological constant, gives Ja = 0
for all hypersurfaces and therefore provides nothing non-
trivial to minimize). However, one might imagine that
minimal-flux hypersurfaces would be defined wherever
there is any reasonable nonzero stress-energy tensor, no
matter how small. A bigger worry in my mind is whether
the sequence of them with smaller and smaller ρ¯ continue
to foliate the spacetime, or whether these hypersurfaces
might cross each other or else simply not cover all of the
spacetime.
Clearly constant-H hypersurfaces, constant-proper-
time hypersurfaces, and minimal-flux hypersurfaces are
all rather ad hoc proposals. Although I am happy to pro-
pose volume averaging rather than volume weighting for
observations within a hypersurface, I am not happy with
anything I have thought of so far for what hypersurfaces
to include and for how to add up their contributions.
This is definitely an ugly part that needs some elegant
new ideas.
VIII. VIOLATION OF THE
CORRESPONDENCE PRINCIPLE
One objection [100] to volume averaging rather than
volume weighting is that it violates the “correspondence
principle” that for a finite spacetime, “The probability of
a given outcome of a measurement can be simply defined
as the relative number of instances when this outcome is
obtained.” For example, consider a k = +1 FRW space-
time with both a big bang and a big crunch, so that the
scale factor a(t) goes to zero at both t = 0 and t = T ,
where t is proper time of the longest timelike curve from
the big bang, and T is the finite lifetime of this uni-
verse. In this simple case the constant-H hypersurfaces
will be the usual homogeneous, isotropic S3 hypersur-
faces of fixed proper time t and 3-volume V3 = 2pi
2a3(t),
and the volume-averaged proper time will be this same
t, since dV4 = V3dt. Therefore, let us use the foliation by
constant-H hypersurfaces and then compare four-volume
weighting with proper-time weighting of the hypersur-
faces.
Now let n(t) be the density per 4-volume of some ob-
servation, for simplicity uniform over each constant-H
hypersurface. Then NVW =
∫ T
0
2pi2a3(t)n(t)dt would
be the total number of these observations in the space-
time, which is what one would get by volume weighting
(equivalent to volume averaging over each hypersurface
and then four-volume weighting for the integral over the
hypersurfaces). On the other hand, volume averaging
over each hypersurface and then proper-time weighting
of the hypersurfaces would give a total weight for the ob-
servation proportional to NV A =
∫ T
0 n(t)dt, simply the
proper-time integral of the average density of observa-
tions. Thus volume averaging gives less weight to ob-
servations when the hypersurfaces have greater volume,
violating the “equivalence principle.”
I readily admit that this is indeed a feature of volume
averaging. However, it is not clear that it is in conflict
with any observational or theoretical requirement. We
have no strong evidence that the probability measures
for individual observations are not actually going down
as the volume of space goes up. However, if we use hy-
persurfaces of constant proper time since decoupling (or
since reheating, assuming inflation occurred earlier) in
our part of the universe, the volume has gone up by only
a tiny fraction during the history of the entire human
race, by a factor less than 1.00005 during the 200 000
years of modern humans. Perhaps, for other things be-
ing equal, our present observations have 0.005% lower
measure than those of early modern humans, but I don’t
see how we could possibly exclude this possibility obser-
vationally.
There would be a serious problem if our pocket uni-
verse had developed as a bubble in a parent universe
with a much greater cosmological constant and if the hy-
persurfaces on which one does the volume averaging have
the main contribution to their volume from the rapidly
expanding parent universe region. Then the total volume
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of the hypersurfaces through us (most of the volume be-
ing in the rapidly expanding parent universe) would be
growing at a rapid logarithmic rate, so with volume av-
eraging the weight for our observations would rapidly de-
crease with time. This would then lead to the youngness
paradox [3, 11, 16, 70]. However, as discussed above, I
prefer to explore the alternative that our pocket universe
formed rather directly, most probably without ancestors,
so that the main contribution to the volume of the hyper-
surfaces lies within our pocket universe itself and is not
growing very rapidly on human scales. Then the violation
of the “correspondence principle,” although in principle
present, would be very tiny during the past lifetime of
human civilization.
IX. APPLICATION TO BOLTZMANN BRAINS
Replacing volume weighting by volume averaging can
greatly ameliorate the problem of Boltzmann brains,
though whether it completely solves the problem depends
on the procedure for the integration over hypersurfaces
and on whether the universe lasts forever. I shall here
leave aside the four-volume weighting procedure, since
that seems to leave the problem in the severe form it has
with the usual volume weighting.
Suppose that the probability per Planck volume of a
Boltzmann brain is very roughly e−I , where I is much,
much larger than the value of the logarithm, say J , of
the reciprocal of the probability per Planck volume of an
ordinary observer in the present universe. For example, I
might be the instanton action for producing a Boltzmann
brain. If one wants a brain of mass and size comparable
to that of a human brain, say mass of the order of 1
kg and size of the order of 0.3 m, then I ∼ 1042 for a
‘brief brain’ [55]. If one wants a brain of mass 1 kg to
last 0.1 second, which is what some people think may be
necessary for it to make an observation, then I ∼ 1050
for a ‘medium brain’ [51, 55]. On the other hand, if one
wants a brain of mass 1 kg to last for several Hubble
times (or to be produced as a real thermal fluctuation in
the future asymptotic de Sitter spacetime), then I ∼ 1069
for a ‘long brain’ [55].
Then in the universe up to the present time, the frac-
tion of Boltzmann brains to ordinary observers is very
roughly e−I+J , so we can ignore their effect from just
the past part of our spacetime. But now suppose ordi-
nary observers mostly die out when the stars burn out
and do not last enormously longer, whereas Boltzmann
brains continue to fluctuate into and out of existence at
their very tiny rates.
If we had used volume weighting, Boltzmann brains
would dominate when the spatial volume is larger than
today by a factor of roughly eI−J . Since the volume
asymptotically grows at a rate e3Hλt, with Hλ =
√
Λ/3
in terms of the cosmological constant Λ, this time is of
the order of t ∼ (I −J)/(3Hλ), of the order of 10
52 years
if ‘brief brains’ can have observations (as I myself would
think is most plausible), 1060 years if one needs ‘medium
brains,’ or 1079 years if one needs ‘long brains’ [51, 55].
Then if the universe is destroyed or decays determinis-
tically before the appropriate one of those times, there
would not be a Boltzmann brain problem. However, it is
hard to see what is likely to make the universe cease to
exist at such a time that is so short in comparison with
the Poincare´ recurrence time of the order of e10
123
years
for de Sitter spacetime with the presently observed value
of the cosmological constant. One gets an even much
shorter expected decay time of the order of 1010 years
to prevent Boltzmann brains from dominating with vol-
ume weighting if the universe decays quantum mechan-
ically by bubble formation rather than deterministically
[53, 59], since with a lower decay rate, the expectation
value of the four-volume diverges, giving an expectation
value of Boltzmann brains per comoving volume that is
infinitely more than of ordinary observers in our universe.
(This result may be modified by a consideration of ordi-
nary observers and/or Boltzmann brains that may form
in the next universe after the bubble decay [56, 57], but
the answer is not clear because of the ambiguities of the
measure problem with volume weighting.)
If we use instead proper-time weighting of hypersur-
faces without volume weighting for observations on hy-
persurfaces, we need the expectation value of the total
proper-time lifetime of the universe (rather than of the
four-volume) to be less than roughly t0e
I−J . If we just
try to get the order of magnitude of the exponent roughly
right, this gives e10
42
years for ‘brief brains,’ e10
50
years
for ’medium brains,’ or e10
69
years for ‘long brains.’ Al-
though these times are also enormously shorter than the
Poincare´ recurrence time for de Sitter spacetime, the log-
arithms of their logarithms are of the same order of mag-
nitude, so it might be plausible that spacetime would
decay within one of those timescales [24, 74]. But if the
universe does last forever in a form wherein Boltzmann
brains can continue to fluctuate into (and out of) exis-
tence, then it appears that there is still a problem with
Boltzmann brains even without volume weighting if one
uses proper-time weighting.
Even if the universe does have an expected decay time
shorter than say e10
42
years, there still may be a problem
[101] if the decay is by bubble formation of terminal vacua
that leaves the bulk of our asymptotically de Sitter space-
time intact. Then presumably the constant-H (or con-
stant proper time) hypersurfaces will continue to evolve
forward in the expanding part of de Sitter spacetime
that remains outside the bubble formation, so that there
would be an infinite time for Boltzmann brains to appear
on it. One might think [98] that the volume fraction of
the hypersurfaces that stay outside the bubbles would
decrease fast enough to lead to a convergence in the inte-
gral over dt of the average density of Boltzmann brains on
the hypersurface (presumably only on the part that stays
outside the terminal bubbles), but if the three-volume in-
side each bubble is small, whereas the part of the hyper-
surface outside keeps expanding with the asymptotically
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de Sitter universe, it seems to me more plausible that the
fraction of the three-volume inside bubbles would always
remain small. Then the density of Boltzmann brains, av-
eraged over the entire hypersurface, would remain near
its nearly constant value in the asymptotically de Sitter
part, and so the integral of that over dt would diverge
along with t.
I would like to postulate that when terminal vacua are
forming, somehow the quantum measure for the hyper-
surfaces decreases exponentially. If one imagined some
sort of collapse of the wavefunction to possible nonexis-
tence over the entire hypersurface with some probability
proportional to the probability that a bubble forms on
the hypersurface, this might be accomplished, but I am
highly sceptical of any collapse of the wavefunction that
would occur acausally over a hypersurface. I suppose one
could still postulate a decrease in the absolute value of
the existence amplitude of the hypersurface, as if it rep-
resented a probability for it to collapse out of existence,
without invoking any actual collapse. However, for this
to be caused by the amplitude for a bubble to occur at
some location on the hypersurface smacks of some de-
gree of acausality. On the other hand, a quantum state
is a function or functional of an entire configuration space
and so is certainly nonlocal. If the quantum state changes
according to what may be happening on the hypersurface
(e.g., by the potential for bubble formation), then since
the quantum state is inherently nonlocal, it may appear
as if the change is acausal.
If it turns out that the proper-time weighting of hyper-
surfaces simply does not work, one might instead turn
to the Hubble-constant-time weighting of hypersurfaces.
Then the integral at late times will not diverge at all,
since H(t) is expected to drop from its present finite
value to a finite asymptotic value HΛ =
√
Λ/3 if the
dark energy driving the current cosmological accelera-
tion is a cosmological constant or a minimum in a scalar
field potential, or else to the finite asymptotic value of
zero if the dark energy decays away. One might expect
a divergence instead at infinite values of H(t) if the uni-
verse started at a big bang with an infinite logarithmic
expansion rate. However, if H(t) has an upper cutoff at
the Planck value, that would also keep the integral con-
vergent and still sufficiently small when weighted by e−I
that Boltzmann brains would not come at all close to
dominating.
Even if one took H(t) back to infinity at a classical
big bang at t = 0, one might argue that in a region
large enough for a Boltzmann brain, the energy density
would be so high that the probability would be exponen-
tially small that it would take the form of a Boltzmann
brain. For example, suppose the entropy goes as a posi-
tive power p of the energy density, which itself is expected
to go as t−2 for small t near the big bang, so that the
entropy in a region of the volume of a Boltzmann brain
goes as S(t) ∼ Ct−2p. Then if there are only a finite num-
ber of configurations in a given volume that would cor-
respond to Boltzmann brains, then the probability that
one of the eS configurations would be a Boltzmann brain
would go roughly as P (t) ∼ e−S(t) ∼ e−Ct
−2p
. Now
if the scale size goes as some positive power q of the
proper time, a(t) ∼ Atq, so that H(t) = a˙/a ∼ q/t and
|dH/dt| ∼ q/t2, then
∫
P (t)|dH/dt|dt ∼
∫
e−Ct
−2p
qt−2dt
clearly does not diverge at t = 0. Almost certainly with
the |dH/dt| weighting factor, the probability of a obser-
vation by a Boltzmann brain in a big-bang universe with
Hubble-constant weighting would be far below that of
an ordinary observer. Thus the Boltzmann brain prob-
lem would be solved with volume averaging of observa-
tions on each hypersurface and with Hubble-constant-
time weighting of hypersurfaces, even if the universe lasts
forever.
On the other hand, in [102] Hawking and I argued
that “In situations in which the wave function can be
interpreted in terms of classical solutions by the WKB
approximation, this choice of measure implies that the
probability of finding the 3-metric and matter field con-
figuration in a given region of superspace is proportional
to the proper time that the solutions spend in that re-
gion.” This argument would tend to support the proper-
time weighting of hypersurfaces.
X. APPLICATION TO PROPOSED QUANTUM
STATES OF THE COSMOS
Volume averaging (rather than volume weighting) for
observations on hypersurfaces thus seems to help solve
the measure problem and the Boltzmann brain problem
(at least if the universe does not last extraordinarily long,
or if one uses Hubble-constant-time weighting of hyper-
surfaces). However, that is only the case if the quan-
tum state of the universe is dominated by finite-volume
spaces that evolve from a big bang (or at least from a
region of high density) and then expand to give ordinary
observers with high probability. There can still be prob-
lems explaining our observations if the quantum state is
dominated by spaces without ordinary observers, such as
large nearly empty spaces.
For example, the Hartle-Hawking ‘no-boundary pro-
posal’ still seems problematic [55], because it gives an
enormous amplitude for nearly empty de Sitter spaces,
whose Boltzmann brains would greatly dominate over
the ordinary observers that only exist in a part of the
quantum state with much lower amplitude, even without
volume weighting. The ‘tunneling’ proposals of Vilenkin,
Linde, and others [76, 103-108] seem to fare better,
though the ones of these that just reverse the sign of
the Euclidean action give divergent amplitudes for arbi-
trarily large perturbations [109-111] (which is not what
Vilenkin’s tunneling proposal does [76, 103, 107, 108],
though one might say that this proposal is not yet pre-
cisely defined, even at the level of minisuperspace).
The no-bang proposal [113] for the quantum state of
the universe appears to avoid some of the problems of the
no-boundary proposal and yet seems to be more precisely
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defined than the tunneling proposal. However, without
volume weighting, the no-bang state appears to be dom-
inated by thermal perturbations of nearly empty de Sit-
ter spacetime, in which almost all observers would pre-
sumably be Boltzmann brains. Since this would almost
certainly make our observations very unlikely, the no-
bang proposal apparently is observationally excluded if
one uses volume averaging rather than volume weighting.
Therefore, for volume averaging to solve the measure
problem and avoid the Boltzmann brain catastrophe, one
needs a quantum state that is not enormously dominated
by nearly empty de Sitter spacetime. One would like
a state that is dominated by spacetimes having a big
bang or bounce at volumes much smaller than that given
by the apparent cosmological constant observed today.
Clearly more work needs to be done to find such a state.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
The measure problem is a severe problem in theoretical
cosmology that is logically independent of the question
of what the quantum state of the universe is. With a
suitable quantum state, replacing volume weighting with
volume averaging in the cosmological measure appears to
help avoid the ambiguities of infinite measures generated
by eternal inflation and also avoid the Boltzmann brain
catastrophe and the youngness paradox. It also appears
to avoid the “Q catastrophe” of exponentially preferring
either huge or tiny primordial density contrasts [114, 115]
and the analogous catastrophe for the gravitational con-
stant G [116]. However, even with this volume averaging
measure, the result does depend on the quantum state,
and one does still need to find a quantum state that would
give sufficiently high probabilities for our observations.
One consequence of volume averaging rather than vol-
ume weighting would be a loss of the argument for infinite
volumes today from eternal inflation [11, 76, 77, 78, 79].
There would still be amplitudes for arbitrarily large
amounts of inflation, but without volume weighting, the
bulk of the probabilities for observations would occur for
spaces with only a bounded amount of inflation. How-
ever, although there is a lot of indirect observational ev-
idence for inflation itself, I think it is fair to say that
so far there is not any observational evidence for infinite
volumes from eternal inflation in particular. (It is hard
to see how we can have any direct observational evidence
about the volume of the spatial hypersurface containing
us, since all of it outside ourselves is acausally related to
us now.) It would be interesting to see whether there is
any observational way to confirm or refute infinite vol-
umes from eternal inflation, other than the Boltzmann
brain catastrophe that often seems to accompany the-
ories of infinite volume from eternal inflation. Volume
averaging can help kill both Boltzmann brains and in-
finite volumes from eternal inflation, but it remains to
be see whether this solution can be observationally dis-
tinguished from solutions that kill Boltzmann brains but
not infinite volumes from eternal inflation.
Many of the implications of volume averaging rather
than volume weighting are qualitatively similar to those
of the causal diamond or holographic point of view of
Bousso and collaborators [23, 25, 31, 33, 54, 70]. They
argue that one should restrict attention to the causal di-
amond region that is both in the past and in the future
of an observer’s history or worldline. I would agree that
perhaps the only testable predictions of a theory involve
such restricted regions. (I would be even more radical
in proposing that the predictions should involve only the
data that has entered the observer and no external data
at all). However, to me it would seem that one should
allow a theory making such predictions to give a more
global description of the quantum state of the universe.
(This is not a claim that there should be some classi-
cal global spacetime for the entire universe. Surely there
will be a huge quantum superposition.) If volume aver-
aging can avoid the problems of volume weighting that
the causal diamond approach also avoids, and yet keep a
global description, then it would seem advantageous
It appears that yet another way to get rather simi-
lar results is the scale-factor cutoff measure [44, 46, 47].
It is not yet clear which of these various approaches is
best. However, I would suspect that as an approxima-
tion to a prescription best given in a quantum analysis,
it would be better to try to avoid properties of a global
classical spacetime, such as any time parameters defined
by some classical history of spacetime. For this reason
I am not convinced that global time cutoffs are the best
approach. This is my motivation for looking at hyper-
surfaces instead and trying to define them quasi-locally,
since three-metrics and matter fields on spacelike hyper-
surfaces are the traditional configuration-space coordi-
nates in canonical quantum gravity. (Of course, there are
severe problems with canonical quantum gravity, includ-
ing the fact that with fluctuations in the geometry it may
not be definite that any hypersurface is acausal, allowing
quantum xeroxing to occur and preventing a description
of the quantum state as a wavefunctional of hypersurface
geometries and matter fields.)
In any case, it may be premature to say which, if any,
of the current approaches is most likely to lead to the ulti-
mate answer to the measure problem. At present it seems
best to investigate a variety of approaches, see what their
consequences are, and try to find whether one can find
a truly quantum implementation. It seems that volume
averaging of observations on hypersurfaces, though by no
means complete without a specification of how to do the
sum over hypersurfaces, merits further investigation.
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